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HART FAILURE: THE SUPREME
JUDICIAL COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF
NONJUDICIAL DEMEANOR
I.

THE PREMISE OF ACCOUNTABILITY

Among the inherent powers of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court
is the power to regulate the officers of its courts.' As the court explained in Board of Overseers of the Bar v. Lee, "each [of the three
co-equal branches of government] has, without any express grant,
the inherent right to accomplish all objects necessarily within the
orbit of that department when not expressly allocated to, or limited
by the existence of a similar power in, one of the other departments."2 It is not surprising that the Supreme Judicial Court has for
many years regulated, through formal disciplinary proceedings, the
conduct of attorneys who practice in its courts.3 The power of the
court to do so has been constitutionally established' and legislatively
recognized, 5 and is necessary to ensure that attorneys will remain
accountable for their conduct.
What is perhaps surprising is that the court's judges, who
"[p]lainly . . . are even more significant officers of the court than
are lawyers," 6 have only for the past decade been monitored by a
1. Board of Overseers of the Bar v. Lee, 422 A.2d 998, 1002 (Me. 1980), appeal
dismissed, 450 U.S. 1036 (1981).
2. Id.
3. See, e.g., Board of Overseers of the Bar v. Murphy, 570 A.2d 1212 (Me. 1990)
(lawyer disbarred for serious violations of bar rules; matter referred by Board of
Overseers of the Bar); Sanborn v. Kimball, 64 Me. 140 (1875) (lawyer prohibited from
practice because of his dishonesty and forgery conviction; formal complaint filed with
the Supreme Judicial Court by the local bar).
4. ME. CONsT. art. VI, § 1 ("The judicial power of this State shall be vested in a
Supreme Judicial Court, and such other courts as the Legislature shall from time to
time establish.").
5. This power has been recognized legislatively. In pertinent part, [ME. Ry.
STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 1] provides:

The Supreme Judicial Court shall have general administrative
and supervisory authority over the judicial department and
shall make and promulgate rules, regulations and orders governing the administration of the judicial department.
In pertinent part, [IM_. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 71 provides:

[The Supreme Judicial Court] has general superintendence of all
inferior courts for the prevention and correction or errors
and abuses where the law does not expressly provide a remedy ....
Matter of Ross, 428 A.2d 858, 868 (Me. 1981).
6. Matter of Benoit, 487 A.2d 1158, 1171 n.20 (Me. 1985). See also Geiler v.
Comm'n on Judicial Qualifications, 515 P.2d 1, 12 (Cal. 1973) (judge removed from
office because of his pattern of judicial misconduct) ("[B]efore the advent of the
Commission on Judicial Qualifications the bar of this state was held to a higher stan.
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permanent investigatory body similar to that which monitors the
conduct of the state's attorneys.7 Through the adoption of the Code
of Judicial Conduct and the establishment of the Committee on Judicial Responsibility, the Supreme Judicial Court told the public
that judges, like other officers of the court, would be subject to the
court's regulatory authority.8 In an early judicial discipline opinion,
the court emphasized that "it is essential for the efficient provision
of even-handed justice for the people of Maine that this court have
the power to sanction judges who violate the Code of Judicial
Conduct.""
The court's early declaration of the need to effectively regulate its
judges follows from the conclusion that judges should be bound to
high standards, whether or not these standards have been codified
into rules such as the Code of Judicial Conduct.1" Consider two of a
judge's roles in our adversarial system. As a decider of cases and
controversies, a judge applies the rule of law as established by the
people's representatives in the legislature or by the common law. As
the authority presiding over a legal dispute, he is not to favor one
particular litigant over another, and must afford opposing parties
equal opportunity to be heard in court. In neither role does the
judge have any sovereign power of his own-he derives his power
exclusively from the people who, through either direct election or
executive appointment, put him on the bench. 1
Because the judge derives all his power from the people, he must
reciprocate this trust by showing respect for the people. The courts
must ensure that the right of the judge to perform duties he has
been empowered to perform is balanced with the people's right to
have the judge perform those duties only as the people have contemdard of conduct than the bench. This anomaly has since been rectified and the reverse is now true.").
7. The Committee on Judicial Responsibility and Disability was established in
1978 by an order of the Supreme Judicial Court. Me. Rptr., 385-388 A.2d LX-LXII.
The power of the court to establish the committee has been legislatively recognized.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 9-B (West 1989). For a discussion of the Committee, see
infra part II.
8. "[T]he power of the Supreme Judicial Court to discipline judges for misconduct finds its source in the Constitution's grant of judicial power to the Court and in
the legislative recognition of the power of the Supreme Judicial Court in [ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 4, §§ 1, 7, 9-B]." Matter of Ross, 428 A.2d at 868.
9. Matter of Benoit, 487 A.2d at 1171.
10. The Supreme Judicial Court adopted the Maine Code of Judicial Conduct in
1974, giving it "the force of a Rule pursuant to the inherent power of [the] Court
.... " Me. Rptr., 313-319 A.2d XXXVII. For more on the Code of Judicial Conduct,
see infra part II.
11. The judge's power is regulated by the judicial branch. ME. CONST. art. VI, § I.
Judicial officers are appointed by the governor subject to confirmation through the
legislative process. ME. CONsT. art. V, pt. 1, § 8. The governor and the Legislature are
the elected enforcer and creators of the laws.
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plated. In other words, a judge must operate in such a way that he is
accountable to the people for his actions. The judge who holds himself accountable to those who empower him is the judge who
is will2
ing to respect not only the law, but other people as well.'
Furthermore, the need for judges to act in a way that commands
the public's respect cannot be limited to a judge's role as a decider
of cases and controversies. Judges conduct a court's affairs under
the supposition that those before them should respect minimum
standards of tolerable conduct-laws established by either a legislature or common-law jurisprudence. Given their authority to pass
judgment on others, judges should themselves respect the highest
standards of conduct.1 3 Although the people cannot expect their
judges to be beyond fault, in order to earn the public trust judges
must be accountable for all their actions."' Judges themselves must
be able to be judged, not only for what they say and do on the bench
but for what they say and do away from it. Given the gravity of his
obligations, a judge's conduct away from the eyes of the courtroom
spectator must be susceptible to review, and given the acknowledged
12. Independence of the judiciary is not inconsistent with accountability for
judicial conduct. Lawless judicial conduct-the administration, in disregard
of the law, of a personal brand of justice in which the judge becomes a law
unto himself-is as threatening to the concept of government under law as
is the loss of judicial independence. We see no conflict btween judicial independence and judicial accountability. Indeed, a lack of judicial accountability may itself be the greatest danger to judicial independence.
Matter of Ross, 428 A.2d at 861.
13. See, e.g., Matter of Kellam, 503 A.2d 1308 (Me. 1986), in which a judge was
censured for his pattern of nonjudicial courtroom demeanor
Judge Kellam professes to believe that the present complaints arise out of
his efforts to be helpful, accommodating and efficient within the constraints
imposed by the judicial system. Such a paradox can only be explained by
an abject failure to appreciate that the litigant has no understanding of the
constraints as perceived by Judge Kellam. By announcing his actions
rudely, brusquely and without explanation, he creates the impression of judicial arrogance and indifference. It is difficult to assess whether he intends
to create that impression, but it is beyond dispute that he should recognize
the result.
Id. at 1311-12.
14. This is reflected in Maine Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 2.
Canon 2. A Judge Should Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of Impropriety in All His Activities.
A. A judge should respect and comply with the law and should conduct
himself at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
B. A judge should not allow his family, social, or other relationships to
influence his judicial conduct or judgment. He should not lend the prestige
of his office to advance the private interests of others; nor should he convey
or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position
to influence him. He should not testify voluntarily as a character witness.
Me. Rptr. 313-319 A.2d XXXIX [hereinafter Code of Judicial Conduct).
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need for public confidence in the judiciary, even the appearance of
impropriety should not go unexamined.1 5
When contemplating an example of judicial "impropriety," one
might initially consider a serious and obvious violation of the law'0
or a flagrant abuse of the judicial office.1 7 Perhaps less obvious is an
instance where the judge, though neither engaging in illegal acts
outside the courtroom nor seriously misapplying the law within it,
demeans jurors with racial insults1 8 or unfairly berates an attorney
in the judge's chambers.' Clearly, a misapplication of the law might
effect an unjust result in a case, and similarly, the impropriety of
failing to meet high standards of judicial demeanor
can severely
20
weaken the confidence people place in the judiciary.
15. Id.

16. See, e.g., Matter of Benoit, 487 A.2d at 1167, in which a District Court judge
was found to have violated the Code of Judicial Conduct. A thirteen-year-old boy
who had been arrested on a number of charges made his initial appearance in District
Court before Judge Benoit. The judge advised the boy, who was unrepresented by
counsel during the appearance, of his right to counsel in subsequent appearances, and
then ordered the boy to be detained at the Maine Youth Center pending the adjudication hearing, then six weeks away. The Supreme Judicial Court concluded that:
Judge Benoit's order detaining a juvenile for a period of nearly six weeks,
before the boy had the assistance of counsel, and without the court's taking
any evidence, ignored the most basic liberties and procedural requirements
of the law ....
By denying [the boy] his fundamental rights, Judge Benoit
committed an error that was obvious and of a most serious nature.
Id.
17. See, e.g., Matter of Cox, 553 A.2d 1255, 1256 (Me. 1989), in which a judge
proposed to counsel the sentence he would impose on a particular defendant if the
defendant were to forego a trial and enter a plea of guilty, and the more severe sentence the judge would impose if the defendant were tried and found guilty. Because
"a judge [who] participates in the specifics of a plea negotiation ... runs afoul of the
fundamental values set forth in [the Code of Judicial Conduct]," id. at 1257, Judge
Cox was reprimanded for his misconduct. Id. at 1258.
Some abuses of the judicial office border on the bizarre. See, e.g., Matter of Perry,
385 N.Y.S.2d 589 (1976), in which a judge was removed from office. Displeased with
the cup of coffee he had purchased from a street vendor outside his chambers, the
judge had three law enforcement officers bring the vendor before him in his chambers, whereupon the vendor was handcuffed and excoriated for the quality of his
product. Under oath before the Commission on Judicial Conduct, the judge lied
about the incident. Id. at 590.
18. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Commission on Judicial Performance, 657 P.2d 372, 38182 (Cal. 1983) (judge removed for his pattern of misconduct that included an inquiry,
during the voir dire of a black grocery clerk, asking whether or not she knew the price
of watermelon); Aldrich v. State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 447 N.E.2d 1276, 1278
(N.Y. 1983) ("his displays of vulgarity and racism and his threats of violence both on
and off the Bench have 'resulted in [an] irretrievable loss of public confidence in his
ability to properly carry out his judicial responsibilities' ") (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
19. See, e.g., Matter of Del Rio, 256 N.W.2d 727, 750 (Mich. 1977) (judge suspended for pattern of misconduct that included berating an attorney for approximately one-half hour in the judge's chambers).
20.. For a discussion of lapses in judicial demeanor in Maine, see infra part III.
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Calling on judges to maintain the highest standards of conduct
and to avoid appearances of impropriety, all fifty states and the Dis2
trict of Columbia have adopted rules governing judicial conduct. '
These rules are for the most part based on the American Bar Association's Model Code of Judicial Conduct, which will be discussed below. Although these rules seek to provide ethical guidance for
judges, it must be recognized that judges have an obligation to remain accountable to the people even absent these mandatory standards. The Model Code is simply an attempt to summarize the conduct to which judges must conform by virtue of the public trust
reposed in them. Properly, the Model Code addresses what is and
what is not appropriate judicial demeanor on and off the bench,
with an acknowledgment that suitable appearances do indeed matter when the public's confidence in the judiciary is at stake.
This Note will discuss the judiciary's efforts to ensure that its
judges preserve the respect of the people by remaining accountable
for their actions. The Note will examine rules which reduce to writing unwritten norms of judicial conduct, such as the ABA's Model
Code of Judicial Conduct, with particular attention to the rules that
govern judicial demeanor. All rules, of course, need mechanisms
through which they can be enforced. Accordingly, Maine's Committee on Judicial Responsibility and Disability will be reviewed as an
example of a state judicial-conduct organization charged with enforcing its version of the Code. Having been charged with this responsibility, the Committee investigates and, when appropriate, refers disciplinary matters to the courts. The law of judicial discipline
as it has developed in Maine will be discussed, and this Note will
show how the court's most recent decision, Matter of Hart,2 2 significantly departs from previous cases in its unwillingness to recognize
the need to ensure that judges remain ultimately accountable to the
people.
II

THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND THE CoMuITEr

ON

JUDICIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND DisABILrry
Although the idea that judges must be accountable for their acFor a collection of cases in which judges have been subject to disciplinary action for
their intemperate language or conduct, see generally Annotation, DisciplinaryAction
against Judge on Ground of Abusive or Intemperate Language or Conduct toward
Attorneys, Court Personnel,or Parties to or Witnesses in Actions, and the Like, 89
A.L.R. 4TH 278 (1991).
21. Forty-seven states have adopted rules based on the 1972 ABA Model Code of
Judicial Conduct. Wisconsin deferred adoption of a revised version of the 1972 Code
pending publication of the 1990 ABA Code of Judicial Conduct. In Montana and
Rhode Island the 1924 Canons of Judicial Ethics are still in effect. M. Peter Moser.
The 1990 ABA Code of Judicial Conduct: A Afodel for the Future. 4 GEo J LEGAL
ETHICS 731, 731 n.3 (1991). See infra part II.
22. 577 A.2d 351 (Me. 1990).
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tions is traceable throughout two hundred years of American jurisprudence,23 it was only seventy years ago that tenets of proper judicial conduct were set to paper for judges to read and follow. At that
time, however, the approach to standards of conduct seemed to reflect an attitude that judges were first independent, and only secondarily accountable. This is reflected in the first attempt to establish
model standards, the American Bar Association's Canons of Judicial
Conduct, which were adopted by the ABA in 1924.24 These thirty-six
Canons were intended to be a guide to proper judicial behavior
rather than an enforceable set of rules; 20 consequently, judges
20
tended not to regard these hortatory standards as actually binding.
In addition, during most of the time the Canons were in effect state
courts were poorly equipped to review a complaint that a judge had
engaged in improper conduct, primarily because there were not yet
any independent commissions empowered to review such a complaint. Only a few states established any procedure through which
judicial conduct could be reviewed, and in the early years these procedures were invariably very formal and governed by the state's
highest court or the chief executive.2 7 Generally, judicial ethics were
a secondary concern. One commentator concurred by remarking:
"Most judges, like most lawyers, appeared to believe they had their
28
ethics well in hand.

23. In support of the proposition that people's rights can be protected only by an
independent and vigorous judiciary, the Supreme Judicial Court in Matter of Ross
cited THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton): "The complete independence of
the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a limited Constitution." Matter of Ross,
428 A.2d at 861 n.3. This sentence, however, occurs in the context of an argument
that Article III judges should sit for life and "hold their offices during good behaviour
.
..
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 522 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961). The full argument is that a free government depends on judges who serve on
the courts long enough to develop, through "long and laborious study," a competent
knowledge of the laws, thereby avoiding "arbitrary discretion in the courts." Id. at
529. Good behavior presupposes that judges should regulate their decisions by the
fundamental laws, that is, the law of the people as declared in the Constitution. Id. at
525. Publius concludes:
[A] temporary duration in office, which would naturally discourage such
characters from quitting a lucrative line of practice to accept a seat on the
bench, would have a tendency to throw the administration of justice into
hands less able, and less well qualified to conduct it with utility and
dignity.
Id. at 530.
24. The first thirty-four Canons were adopted by the ABA in 1924. Canons 35 and

36 were adopted in 1937.

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, OPINIONS OF THE COMMITTE.E ON

(1957).
25. Jeffrey M. Shaman, JudicialEthics, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 3 (1988) [hereinafter Shaman].
26. Id. (quoting Robert B. McKay, Judges, the Code of Judicial Conduct, and
Nonjudicial Activities, 1972 UTAH L. REV. 391, 391).
27. See infra text accompanying notes 45-48.
28. Andrew L. Kaufman, Judicial Ethics: The Less-Often Asked Questions, 64
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND GRIEVANCES iX
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In 1972 the American Bar Association modified the purely aspirational language of the original Canons by enacting the Model Code
of Judicial Conduct. 29 The terms of the new Code reflected both the
prior confusion of judges unsure of the extent to which the Canons
governed their conduct and a growing consensus in the legal community that the public should know that the judiciary was bound to
ethical standards." Although the Canons of Judicial Ethics provided
a starting place for the new Code, the ABA's Committee in charge of
drafting the Model Code carefully examined scores of other sources,
including the codes of judicial conduct of several states, bills introduced in Congress to regulate the conduct of federal judges, and
commentators' opinions.3 1 To combat the original Canons' primary
deficiency, the Committee took the position that the Code should
establish mandatory standards.32 Since 1972, the Model Code has
been adopted, in whole or in good part, by Maine, forty-six other
33
states, and the District of Columbia.
Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct is the most important
section of the Code. Recognizing that "[a]n independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society,"'3 Canon 1
states that "[a] judge should participate in establishing, maintaining, and enforcing, and should himself observe, high standards of
conduct so that the integrity and independence of the judiciary may
be preserved."3 5 This language indicates that judicial independence
can be maintained only if a judge is willing to respect accepted standards of conduct; by observing these high standards, he holds himself accountable to the people, and respects the law they have created for the judge to administer.3 6 Although "[i]t is axiomatic that
an independent and vigorous judiciary is essential as a bulwark to
protect the right of our citizens," ' the independent judiciary must
work within a system that respects the people's laws, not outside of
the system. Otherwise, administration of the laws becomes merely
the exercise of a personal brand of justice, producing a result that an
"independent judiciary" was in the first instance supposed to

WASH. L. REv. 851, 852 (1989).

29.
30.
(1973).
31.
32.
33.

MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

E.

(1972).

WAYNE THODE, REPORTER'S NoTEs TO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

45-48

Id. at 42-43.
Id. at 43.
See supra note 21. Further references to the "Code of Judicial Conduct" will

be to the Maine Code of Judicial Conduct, adopted in 1974, which in pertinent part
duplicates the language of the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct. See supra note
10.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 1.
Id.
See supra note 23.
Matter of Ross, 428 A.2d at 861.
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avoid.38 In short, accountability is not a product of judicial independence-it is the foundation upon which judicial independence
rests.39
Two sections of the Code specifically call upon judges to maintain
proper judicial demeanor to comply with the mandate of Canon 1.
Canon 2A insists that "[a] judge. . . should conduct himself at all
times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity
and impartiality of the judiciary," 0 so that he may avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all his activities. 4 1 Consonant with the obligation to perform the duties of the judicial office
impartially and diligently, 42 Canon 3 A(3) requires a judge to "be
patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers, and others with whom he deals in his official capacity. .... ,,43
If a judge departs from either Canon 2A or Canon 3 A(3) he conveys
the impression that he is unconcerned with maintaining the integrity of the judicial system, which in turn weakens public confidence
in the courts. Since the Model Code contains mandatory standards
that have been adopted by the majority of states, it has become part
of the substantive law for judges in those jurisdictions. However, no
substantive provision can command the respect of a rule of law if
there is no mechanism through which it can be enforced; the Code
"[can]not reach full potential in the absence of an effective system
of procedures and penalties in each jurisdiction that adopts the
Code."""
At the time the 1924 Canons were adopted, no jurisdiction had
established procedures to review allegations of judicial misconduct.
Originally, judicial misconduct was dealt with primarily through for4
mal and cumbersome procedures conducted outside the judiciary. "
38. See infra part III for a discussion of Maine cases in which this conclusion is
supported. See also Matter of Barrett, 512 A.2d 1030, 1034 (Me. 1986):
The fault in Judge Barrett's course of purposeful conduct in Elmer E. and
Brittany P. does not lie alone in the months and years of delay that resulted; rather, the principal fault lies in the fact that he determinedly administered his own personal brand of justice, in plain and direct violation of
the standards governing a judge's performance of his high responsibilities.
39. See supra note 12.
40. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 2A.
41. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 2.
42. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3.
43. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3 A(3).
44. E. WAYNE THODE, REPORTER'S NOTES TO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 43 (1973).
45. Edward J. Schoenbaum, A Historical Look at Judicial Discipline, 54 Ciui.KENT L. REV. 1, 1-13 (1977) [hereinafter Schoenbaum]. Apart from "action by a permanent judicial disciplinary commission" (the standard mechanism for judicial discipline) and "removal by judicial action" (the standard in Europe-a body of judges
sits ad hoc to address possible judicial misconduct), Schoenbaum identifies six other
traditional methods of judicial discipline. These are "executive action" (chief executive or monarch removes the judge); "address" (legislature formally requests that the
executive remove the judge); "impeachment" (legislature commences quasi-criminal
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The only available sanction was removal, which was and is today an
inappropriate response to most instances of judicial misconduct.4' In
the 1940s and 1950s, a few states established procedures to deal
somewhat more effectively with instances or allegations of judicial
misconduct.'7 New York went so far as to establish a special Court
on the Judiciary, but this court could address misconduct only
through the sanction of removal, and in any event was convened
only twice in its first fifteen years.'8 The first permanent commission to handle investigations into judicial misconduct was established in California in 1960 under the authority of a popularly enacted amendment to the California constitution. 4 Following
California's lead, all fifty states and the District of Columbia now
have a judicial conduct organization which has the power to investigate allegations of judicial misconduct.20
proceedings against the judge); "recall" (judge removed by a special vote of the electorate); "defeat at election"; and "bar association action." "[These methods] have
been replaced for a variety of reasons, including the unfair nature of their procedures,
prohibitive cost, ineffectiveness, and the limited nature of grounds for removal." Id.
at 1-2.
46. Impeachment and address are too cumbersome and too severe to be the
only sanctions available for judicial discipline. They are so difficult to effect
that the other branches might be hesitant to undertake them. Especially is
this so, since they can lead only to the ultimate sanction of removal, which
will not be warranted in the vast majority of discipline cases ....
Matter of Benoit, 487 A.2d at 1171; see Shaman, supra note 25, at 10 (penalty of
removal is "draconian").
47. Schoenbaum, supra note 45, at 17-18.
48. Id. at 17. The New York Court on the Judiciary was established by constitutional amendment in 1947. The Court could be convened by its chief judge, a presiding justice of the appellate division of the supreme court, or by a majority of the
executive committee of the state Bar Association. Before the court was convened,
notice of the charges was sent to the governor, the president of the Senate, and the
speaker of the state assembly. If a member of the Legislature preferred that the same
charges be heard by the Legislature itself, the judge was obligated to respond to the
Legislature only, and not to the special court. The court did not have its first meeting
until 1959; its second meeting was in 1962. Id.
49. Id. at 20. See CAr CoNsT. art. VI, § 8, which in 1976 changed the name of the
organization from the Commission on Judicial Qualifications to the Commission on
Judicial Performance.
50. Shaman, supra note 25, at 11. There are essentially two types of judicial conduct organizations: one-tier and two-tier. In the one-tier model, such as California
and Maine have, a state commission is charged with investigating allegations of judicial misconduct. This body reports its findings to the state's highest court. In a twotier system, such as the one in Illinois, the investigating commission reports to another "Courts Commission," which has the power to independently find facts and
issue sanctions. Both commissions are independent of the state's judicial system. The
decisions of the Courts Commission are generally not appealable to the state's supreme court. See generallyFrank Greenberg, The Illinois "Two-Tier" Judicial Disciplinary System: Five Years and Counting, 54 CHL-.KNT L Rzv. 69 (1977); John H.
Gillis and Elaine Fieldman, Michigan's Unitary System of Judicial Discipline: A
Comparison with Illinois' Two-Tier Approach, 54 CHL-KENT L Rav. 117 (1977).
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As judicial conduct organizations came to be established, concern
was voiced in the judiciary that these organizations might unjustifiably curtail a judge's discretion and independence. 1 One writer cautioned: "While means of judicial discipline must be available to protect the citizenry from abuse by biased and arbitrary judges, those
sanctions must never be applied to preclude a judge from deciding
cases in accordance with his understanding of the law and the dictates of his own conscience." 52 In response to this concern, states
have tailored the powers of their organizations to balance judicial
independence and judicial discipline. States that have adopted the
Model Code explicitly recognize this concern for decisional independence in Canon 1, which calls for the preservation of an independent
judiciary.5 3 In fact, the Code provides no means by which the authority of a judge to make judicial decisions can be curtailed. The
Code is not to be used to review a judge's lawful adjudications, and
no state judicial conduct organization is authorized to serve what is
an essentially appellate role. 5'
Pursuant to its inherent power to regulate the judiciary provided
by the Maine Constitution, the Supreme Judicial Court created the
Committee on Judicial Responsibility and Disability (the Committee) in 1978.11 Seven persons sit on the Committee, including two
active or active retired members of the judiciary, two members of
the Maine Bar, and three members of the public.56 Each member of
the Committee is appointed by the Supreme Judicial Court for a
six-year term; the public member and the attorneys are appointed
upon recommendation of the Governor." The court also appoints a
chairperson for the Committee and four alternates who serve whenever a seated member of the Committee must recuse himself or is
otherwise unable to participate in Committee actions.58
51. See Shaman, supra note 25, at 8.
52. Schoenbaum, supra note 45, at 23.
53. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
54. Jeffrey Shaman, Director of the Center for Judicial Conduct Organizations at
the American Judicature Society, suggests that
the judicial disciplinary process can strengthen judicial independence by
bolstering the principle that judges should not be liable to reprisal merely
because their decisions are wrong or out of favor. Admittedly, there is a risk
that this principle will not be faithfully observed and that discipline will be
used improperly to encroach upon judicial independence. Thus far, however, in the approximately twenty-five year history of modern judicial discipline, that risk has come to fruition on only a few occasions.
Jeffrey M. Shaman, State Judicial Conduct Organizations, 76 Ky. L.J. 811, 858
(1987-88).
55. See supra note 7.
56. Establishment of Committee on Judicial Responsibility and Disability, Me.
Rptr., 385-388 A.2d LX.
57. Id.
58. Amendment of Order Establishing Committee on Judicial Responsibility and
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Pursuant to authority granted by the court, the Committee receives complaints addressing the conduct of Maine judges.,, Upon
receiving a complaint, the Committee first examines whether or not
the complaint falls within its jurisdiction. 0 If it does not, the complaint is dismissed and the complainant and the judge who was the
subject of the complaint are notified of this decision. This procedure
is also followed if it is determined that the complaint is unfounded
or provides insufficient cause for proceeding on the matter."1
In addition, the Committee may seek the informal correction of a
judge's conduct by bringing the conduct to the attention of the
Chief Justice or another appropriate official of the judicial department. Such a recommendation "shall not necessarily preclude further action on the complaint." 2 If the Committee's investigation of
a complaint leads it to conclude that the matter is within its authority and provides sufficient cause to merit further attention, the complaint is referred to the judge and a response from him is requested.6 3 After the response is examined, either a majority of the
Committee or the judge himself can request a hearing before the
Committee.6 4
Disability, Me. Rptr., 479-487 A.2d XXXIX.
59. Establishment of Committee on Judicial Responsibility and Disability, Me.
Rptr., 385-388 A.2d LXI.
60. Rules of the Committee on Judicial Responsibility and Disability, reprinted
in MAINE RULES OF COURT at 522 (1991) [hereinafter Rules], Rule lB. The Committee
may also initiate an investigation of a matter within its authority on its own motion.
Id. at Rule 1C.
61. Id. Rules 1B(ii)-(iii).
62. Amendment of Order Establishing Committee on Judicial Responsibility and
Disability, Me. Rptr., 434-440 A.2d XXXVI.
63. Rules, supra note 60, Rule 1B(iii).
64. Id. Rule 2. Rule 2 extends to the judge various procedural safeguards, such as
the right to have counsel present, the right to cross-examine witnesses, and due notice containing a statement of alleged misconduct including reference to any section
of the Code of Judicial Conduct alleged to have been violated.
One of the thornier issues in the law of judicial discipline is the extent to which
judges should be afforded traditional procedural safeguards when brought before a
judicial conduct organization hearing. In Maine, the Committee is an investigating
agency, not an adjudicatory one. One judge investigated by the Committee argued a
denial of due process in that there were combined in the Committee investigative,
adjudicative, and prosecutorial responsibilities. This challenge was dismissed by the
Supreme Judicial Court, which held that since the court independently finds facts
and draws conclusions of law, the Committee does not adjudicate-it merely files the
official allegations against the judge in its report. Matter of Ross, 428 A.2d at 860-61.
The Supreme Judicial Court has compared the Committee to an investigatory
agency similar to a grand jury in criminal proceedings. Id. at 860. A minority of
courts characterize judicial disciplinary proceedings as "quasi-criminal," thus requiring the extension of due process protections available to criminal defendants. Jeffrey
M. Shaman, State Judicial Conduct Organizations,76 Ky LJ,811, 836 (1987-83).
However,
[t]he most logical and enlightened approach to this question has been taken
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The Committee's Rules instruct it to make findings of fact and
draw conclusions of law. 5 In doing so, after the hearing the Committee must decide whether it is satisfied by a preponderance of the
evidence that the judge has violated the Code of Judicial Conduct
and that the violation is of such a serious nature as to warrant formal disciplinary action.68 If the Committee indeed finds that serious
misconduct has occurred, it reports its conclusions to the Supreme
Judicial Court." "The report of the Committee is nothing more than
a charging document containing the Committee's allegations concerning the conduct of the [judge]. The burden is on the Committee
to prove those allegations before the full Court."6 8 The court then
makes de novo findings of fact and conclusions of law; none of the
factual findings in the report is given any deference.69
III. Ross, KELLAM, AND COX: JUDICIAL DEMEANOR ANALYZED
Since its establishment in 1978 the Maine Committee has charged
four judges with inappropriate judicial demeanor violative of the
Code of Judicial Conduct and reported the matters to the Supreme
Judicial Court. In three of these cases,7 0 Matter of Ross,7 1 Matter of
Kellam,7 2 and Matter of Cox,7 3 the court determined that the re-

spective judges' conduct violated the Code, that the Committee was
authorized to bring the matter to the attention of the court, and
by the Supreme Court of Washington. This court has held that, even
though a judicial disciplinary proceeding is not criminal in nature, certain
due process protections are required because of the potentially severe consequences to a judge. These include, according to the Washington high
court, the right 1) to notice of the charge and the nature and the cause of
the accusation in writing; 2) to notice, by name, of the person or persons
who brought the complaint; 3) to appear and to defend in person or by
counsel; 4) to testify on his own behalf; 5)to confront witnesses face to face;
6) to subpoena witnesses in his own behalf; 7) to be apprised of the intention to make the matter public; 8) to appear and to argue orally the merits
of the holding of a pubic hearing; 9) to prepare and to present a defense;
10) to have a hearing within a reasonable time; and 11) to appeal.
Id. (citing Matter of Deming, 736 P.2d 639, 650 (Wash. 1987)).
In Maine, a hearing before the Committee will be open to the public if the judge so
requests. Even if the judge does not request a public hearing, one will take place if a
majority of the Committee requests it. Amendment of Order Establishing Committee
on Judicial Responsibility and Disability, Me. Rptr., 467-478 A.2d XXIX.
65. Rules, supra note 60, Rule 21.
66. Id. Rule 2H.
67. Id. Rule 21.
68. Matter of Ross, 428 A.2d at 860.
69. Matter of Benoit, 487 A.2d at 1161 n.1.
70. The fourth case was Matter of Hart, 577 A.2d 351 (Me. 1990). See infra part
IV.
71. 428 A.2d 858 (Me. 1981).
72. 503 A.2d 1308 (Me. 1986).
73. 532 A.2d 1017 (Me. 1987).
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that this attention was warranted in light of the need to ensure that
accountability would not be sacrificed in the name of judicial
independence.
In Matter of Ross, Judge Ross of the Maine District Court was
held to have violated Canon 3 A(3) of the Code of Judicial Conduct
by "us[ing] abusive, intemperate, and vulgar language against persons before him. '7 4 In one instance, the judge responded angrily to a
defendant who, outside the courtroom, had referred to the judge
with a vulgar epithet. Remarking that "the Court did not relish the
idea of being called a 'dink,'" the judge cautioned that "the Court
could really be a 'dink,'" and promptly doubled the forfeiture that
had been imposed on the defendant just a few minutes before.7 1 On
another occasion, allegations of sexual child abuse against a father
had necessitated a protective custody hearing. Although there were
only allegations against the father, the judge reproached him for his
conduct in "language that he would understand loud and clear." 0
"[Judge Ross'] final remark was a French 'patois' which [he] translated

. . .

knowing[] that [the father] would get the message ...

What emerges clearly is that the [judge] suggested to the individual
before him that he should masturbate rather than sexually abuse his
children.

7

7

The Supreme Judicial Court reiterated that this was a

custody hearing; no charges against the individual were actually
pending.78
Defending himself against the charge stemming from the second
of these episodes, Judge Ross argued that the way in which he spoke
to the individual was proper because of the need "to address him in
such language that he would understand loud and clear."" The
court strongly rejected the idea that a party's lack of education has
any bearing on how he deserves to be treated in court, arguing that
a judge must be accountable to all persons equally-otherwise, the
people would feel as if "equal justice under law" were nothing more
than a term of art. Addressing the premise that a judge should act
in a way that reflects his status as the people's chosen conduit
74. Matter of Ross, 428 A.2d at 865.
75. Id. The defendant had admitted to possessing a usable amount of marijuana.
a civil violation. Judge Ross imposed a forfeiture of $100. Outside the courtroom, the
defendant vented his displeasure with the judge. A court officer reported the defendant's statements to the judge, including the words "f-ing dink." The judge recalled
the defendant into the courtroom, whereupon he doubled the forfeiture. Id. at 862.
The Supreme Judicial Court found that the increase in the forfeiture amounted to an
illegal summary procedure in response to a criminal contempt not seen or heard by
the judge, which must be prosecuted on notice and after hearing. Acting in this way.
the judge "willfully disregarded the requirements of the law." Id.
76. Id. at 865. In his response to the Committee, Judge Ross remarked that the
defendant "does not hold a Ph.D. in English." Id.
77. Id. at 865-66.
78. Id. at 866.
79. Id. at 865.
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through which the law is administered, the court reminded the judge
that when he "presides in court, he personifies the law, he represents the sovereign administering justice and his conduct must be
worthy of the majesty and honor of that position. Language such as
the [judge] used in both these cases degrades and diminishes the law
"80

In Ross the court concluded that intemperate demeanor manifests
the administration of a personal brand of justice.8 1 Subsequently, in
Kellam, the court observed that nonjudicial courtroom demeanor
can directly and substantially interfere with the administration of
justice.8 2 District Court Judge Kellam was charged with violating
the Code of Judicial Conduct through his pattern of impatient, undignified, and discourteous conduct, which took among its many
forms brusqueness to litigants seeking the court's protection, telling
witnesses he was not going to pay any attention to them, and ordering social workers to leave his courtroom in the course of a public
proceeding.8 3 Such conduct, said the court, amounted to the judge
administering his own brand of justice, for the result of his actions
was a denial of the opportunity to be fully heard in court."'
Judge Kellam defended his conduct by arguing that the need for
administrative efficiency and the problems presented by litigants
appearing in court without an attorney demanded the sort of behavior described above. The court rejected this notion, remarking that
no desire to be "helpful, accommodating, and efficient ' 's5 can justify
behavior that "creates the impression of judicial arrogance and indifference."86 By saying so, the court reiterated two principles of judicial conduct initially advanced in Ross. First, a goal of administrative efficacy or ease, or a sincere belief that an action would better
80. Id. at 866.
81. Id.
82. Matter of Kellam, 503 A.2d at 1311 ("We determine that, in the conduct reported herein, a reasonable person would find a lack of patience, dignity and courtesy
in Judge Kellam's actions and would have reason to doubt that he was being accorded
the 'full right to be heard according to the law.' ").
83. Illustrative of Judge Kellam's rudeness are his comments to persons
seeking protection from abuse orders. To a husband who testified concerning death threats from his wife he remarked that "You're here, aren't you?

She didn't kill you yet." To a wife petitioning for protection from abuse he
asked "He hasn't changed since he met you, why did you marry him?" and
"Why do you want me to do something about it now?" ...
.. . He recessed hearings at inopportune times and occasionally expressed reluctance to hear the case at all. His interruption of witnesses and litigants
in small claims cases sometimes prevented any understandable presentation
of the facts. This conduct and the effect on the lay litigants was observed
and testified to by third parties present in the courtroom at the time.
Id. at 1310.
84. Matter of Ross, 428 A.2d at 866.
85. Matter of Kellam, 503 A.2d at 1311.
86. Id. at 1312.
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secure justice for all parties, cannot justify departures from the

Code of Judicial Conduct, which establishes minimum standards of
conduct and propriety. 7 Second, even the mere impression of judicial impropriety can lead an affected individual to doubt that judges
are in fact accountable to the people they serve." The admonition
by the Kellam court raises a further question: What if the judge's
conduct involves a lack of judgment not related to a matter pending
before him? Or, in the alternative, what if this conduct occurs
outside of the courtroom, perhaps in the privacy of the judge's
chambers?
In Matter of Cox 9 the court concluded that qualifiers such as
these cannot be used to distinguish between suitable judicial conduct and misconduct. District Court Judge Cox, displeased with the
manner in which the police had handled his son's recent motor vehicle violation, called into his chambers the attorney representing his
son and a police captain of the arresting police force. The police
captain appeared regularly in the judge's court, managing his department's cases that were heard there. The judge expressed his irritation at the department's arrest of his son by shouting and swearing at the police captain. He went on to suggest that he might be
unable to remain impartial in matters to be heard in court that
morning involving the police captain's department9 0
The court found that Judge Cox violated Canons 1, 2A, 2B, and 3
A(3) of the Code of Judicial Conduct.91 The court particularly addressed the violation of Canon 2B, which forbids a judge from allowing his family relationships to influence his judicial conduct or
judgment.92 The judge did not in fact demonstrate any partiality in
matters thereafter concerning the police department, nor did he
take other steps to affect the aftermath of his son's arrest. However,
the damage had been done, and the court was careful to note that
the fact that persons outside the judge's chambers could hear the
exchange was immaterial. 3 Canon 2 requires that a judge "conduct
himself at all times in a manner that promotes confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary .... The Code's standard
of conduct therefore applies to any incident or conversation, public
87. See Matter of Ross, 428 A.2d at 861: "[Alny differences in style must always
result in justice administered according to law and must be in accord with minimum
standards of propriety. To establish such minimum standards of conduct and propriety, we promulgated the Code of Judicial Conduct in 1974."
88. See supra text accompanying notes 40-44.
89. Matter of Cox, 532 A-2d 1017 (Me. 1987).
90. Id. at 1017-18.
91. Id. at 1020.
92. Id. at 1019. See supra note 14 for the text of Canon 2B.
93. Id.
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or private, that could constitute or create the appearance of
9
impropriety." '
The court's interpretation of the Code in Cox is important because it demonstrates a willingness to hold judges to high standards
of conduct outside the courtroom. The extension of the standards of
conduct to any incident that could constitute impropriety goes beyond actions involving specifically judicial matters. The court is
building here upon Canon 2, which demands judicious conduct in all
the judge's activities, instead of Canon 3, which governs the duties
of the judicial office. Thus, a judge can be found to have committed
an impropriety even if his conduct is unrelated to a matter over
which he is presiding, and even if the conduct takes place in private.
To conclude otherwise would send a message to a judge that he
needs to be concerned only with earning the public's trust when he
sits on the bench within the public's eye. To say that a judge personifies the law only in an open court would reject the original premise that judges take their power from the people and are ultimately answerable to them.
One theme present in Ross, Kellam, and Cox is that the judge
who fails to respect the dignity and integrity of those with whom he
interacts cannot reasonably be expected to show the necessary respect for the laws he is to apply fairly and equally. Taken together,
these cases conscientiously reflect the imperative of judicial accountability. However, in Maine's most recent judicial discipline matter,
Matter of Hart,95 the court turned its back on its progeny, raising
the troubling possibility that these cases may lose much of their
precedential authority.
IV.

MATTER OF HART

A.

Background

In Matter of Hart, the Committee charged Sagadahoc County
Probate Judge Ronald Hart with violating a number of sections of
the Code of Judicial Conduct, among them Canons 1, 2A, and 3
A(3).9 6 The Supreme Judicial Court is an independent finder of facts
in judicial discipline proceedings. In order to determine whether or
not the Hart court reached "the appropriate legal conclusions, any
analysis should begin with a review of the findings of fact."9
At issue in the case was Judge Hart's handling of a particular
94. Id.
95. Matter of Hart, 577 A.2d 351 (Me. 1990).
96. Id.
97. Matter of Ross, 428 A.2d at 860 ("[I]n [these] original proceeding[s] before
the Supreme Judicial Court the Court would not be functioning as an appellate tribunal, would give no deference to the purported findings and conclusions of the Com-

mittee and would independently find the facts and reach the appropriate legal
conclusions.").
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matter with an attorney. The attorney had called the judge to request an expedited hearing on a motion for appointment of an interim trustee. The original trustee had died, and the attorney sought
to have her client receive the appointment, pursuant to the client's
instructions."8
The attorney called Judge Hart on August 12, 1988, to tell him
that she would be filing a motion for appointment of an interim
trustee. Having learned that Judge Hart recused himself in 1980
from different proceedings involving the decedent's estate out of
which the trust arose, she asked if he would again be recusing himself.99 Judge Hart indicated to her that he would not recuse himself
unless there were cause to do so.100
Later that day, the attorney called the probate judge in Androscoggin County. She indicated to him that her client wanted a successor trustee appointed as soon as possible, and she asked if he could
be available for a hearing if Judge Hart recused himself. He indicated that he would be available. 101 The Androscoggin County probate judge testified a year later before the Committee that the attorney had indicated to him that Hart might indeed have a conflict of
interest.0 2
On August 16, 1988, the attorney filed two petitions with the Register of Probate in Sagadahoc County, which were received the next
day. One was a "Verified Petition for Appointment of Interim Trustee and for Order Securing the Documents and Assets of the Trust"
and the other was a "Petition for Transfer of Trust to Adjoining
County." ° In her cover letter, she asked the Register to "kindly
bring these to the immediate attention of Judge Hart," adding that
"[s]hould Judge Hart disqualify himself and grant the Petition for
Transfer, Judge Raymond is available for a prompt hearing and immediate action on the Petition for Interim Trustee. Kindly advise if
you or Judge Hart has any question."' "
At this point, the attorney was aware that another party in the
matter had filed a "Petition for Temporary and Permanent Appointment of Successor Trustee," and that Judge Hart had scheduled a hearing on this petition for September 6, 1988. All attorneys
involved were asked to be present before the court. °a In her cover
letter of August 16th, however, the attorney also asked that her peti98. Matter of Hart, 577 A.2d at 352.
99. Id. at 352 n.4.
100. Id. at 352.
101. Id.
102. Appendix to Report to the Supreme Judicial Court Recommending Disciplinary Action, at A-356, Matter of Hart, 577 A.2d 351 (Me. 1990) (JUD-89-1) [hereinafter Record].

103. Id. at A-43 to A-48.
104. Id. at A-690.
105. Id. at A-689 to A-690.
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tions be heard on an expedited basis. As she put it: "[T]he expense
of securing the trust property at the rate of twenty-two ($22.00) dollars per hour and the facts set forth in the attached petitions will
justify a preliminary hearing and action on the same prior to the
September 6, 1988 hearing." 106 When she called the Register to
check on the status of her petitions, she learned that Judge Hart
had no plans
to hear her petition at any time before the September
10 7
6 hearing.

On August 19, the attorney called the Androscoggin County probate judge and told him that Judge Hart was unavailable until September 6. She asked him if he would hold an immediate hearing on
the matter. He said that he would, and he agreed to meet with all
parties involved on August 22. This judge then called the Register of
Probate in Sagadahoc County to ascertain the status of the trust.
Judge Hart called him back soon thereafter to discuss these recent
developments. 0 8
After this conversation, Judge Hart arranged a conference call
with the attorneys representing parties in the case. After addressing
the appointment of an interim trustee, Judge Hart then turned to
the conduct of the attorney. 0 9 He testified:
After I paused, I then said, "Ms. Farry, I'd like you to appear
before me on September 6 at 8:30 in the morning to tell me why
you lied to Judge Raymond." . . . [T]here was another pause, and
she responded, "What do you mean by that?" . . . I said, "You

think very carefully about what I've asked and be prepared to explain it to me when you come in on September 6."" 0

The attorney, Ms. Farry, recalled in her testimony that Judge Hart
told her:
"Ms. Farry, I want you to appear here on September 6-or to appear in this courtroom on September 6-to explain your lying and
highly unethical conduct." . . . I believe I asked him what he
meant by lying .... [Hie said, "Think about it and be here-just

be here on September 6.""
Soon after the conference call, the attorney received phone calls
from the other two attorneys in the matter, who expressed their concern about what they had heard during the conference call." 2 She
also drafted a letter to Judge Hart and Judge Raymond in which she
tried to explain her conduct."'
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at A-690.
Id. at A-249 to A-250.
Matter of Hart, 577 A.2d at 352-53.
Id. at 353.
Record at A-208.
Id. at A-256 to A-257.
Id. at A-259 to A-260.
Id. at A-328 to A-329.
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On Friday, August 26, 1988, the attorney filed two documents in
the Sagadahoc County Probate Court. One was a "Notice of Removal" of the appointment proceedings to the Sagadahoc County
Superior Court pursuant to Maine Rule of Probate Procedure
71A. 114 The second was a "Notice of Dismissal" of her petition to
transfer the matter to the Androscoggin County Probate Court.115
The following business day, the Sagadahoc County Register of Probate transferred the file to Superior Court pursuant to the "Notice
of Removal."' 18 Although the "Notice of Dismissal" purported to be7
'
voluntary pursuant to Maine Rule of Probate Procedure 41(a)(2), "
Judge Hart treated the earlier petition to transfer as a probate proceeding rather than a civil proceeding, 1 8 and entered the following
order on the bottom of the "Notice of Dismissal":
8/26/88
Attorney Farry to be personally present before this Court, Tuesday, (8:30 a.m.) Sept. 6, 1988 to discuss further proceedings pursuant to 41(a)(1) M.[I]PP.P.
Is! Ronald A. Hart, Judge' 9
114. Matter of Hart, 577 A.2d at 353. Me. R. Prob. P. 71A provides: "Any party to
a civil proceeding may . . . remove the proceeding to the Superior Court in the
county in which the Probate Court where the proceeding was commenced sits." See
also M. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 7-201(a) (West 1989) ("The court has jurisdiction concurrent with the Superior Court of proceedings initiated by interested parties
concerning the internal affairs of trusts.").
115. Matter of Hart, 577 A-2d at 353.
116.

Id.

117. Me. R. Prob. P. 41(a) provides:
(a) Voluntary Dismissal; Effect Thereof.
(1) ProbateProceedings.No probate proceeding may be dismissed at the
instance of the applicant or petitioner save upon the order of the court and
upon such terms or conditions, including notice of a proposed dismissal to
all interested persons, as the court deems proper. Unless otherwise specified
in the order, a dismissal under this paragraph is without prejudice.
(2) Civil Proceedings.Rule 41(a) of the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure
governs procedure in civil proceedings in the Probate Courts.
Compare Me. R. Prob. P. 41(a) with Me. R. Civ. P. 41(a), to which this Probate Rule
refers: "[A]n action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court (i) by
filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service by the adverse party of an answer or of a motion for summary judgment, whichever first occurs ......
118. Matter of Hart, 577 A.2d at 353.
119. Record at A-111. Judge Hart wrote this order to the attorney on her "Notice
of Dismissal" of the motion to transfer the matter to the Androscoggin County Probate Court. The attorney had classified the appointment proceedings as a civil proceeding. The Probate Court has jurisdiction concurrent with the Superior Court of
proceedings initiated by interested parties concerning the internal affairs of trusts.
Ma. Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 7-201 (West 1989); all proceedings in which the two
courts have concurrent jurisdiction are "civil proceedings." Me. R. Prob. P. 2(b).
Rule 41(a) of the Civil Rules governs the procedure in civil proceedings in the probate courts. Me. R Prob. P. 41(a)(2). Thus, the attorney thought her motion could be
dismissed at any time-without order of the court-upon the filing of a notice of
dismissal. See Me. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1).
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On the 6th of September, the attorney appeared as directed
before Judge Hart in his chambers. In addition to the judge and the
attorney, the Register of Probate and a court reporter were present.
The proceeding began at 10:05 and lasted until 11:43, and was recorded in its entirety. 120 The transcript begins as follows:
JUDGE HART: The next matter on the court's docket this
morning is . . . Docket No. 84-223. Appearing in this court this
morning is Attorney Rita M. Farry ....
from Portland, Maine.
Also present in the courtroom this morning is ... the register of

probate, and I am Judge Ronald A. Hart of the probate court. 12'
Throughout the proceeding, no one spoke except Judge Hart. 12
With exaggerated care and deliberation, he related his version of the
attorney's conduct. Referring to himself as "the Court," the judge
formally marked exhibits and entered them into the record on his
own motions.2

At one point he stated: "[The Court] . . . felt her

conduct was [as] contemptuous, contumacious, insubordinate, obstructionist, and egregious as I have ever seen in the 20 years I have
24

been here.'

Noting that "[tihis court is of the opinion that Attor-

ney Farry did practice gross fraud and deceit lying to [Judge Raymond]," he found probable violations of Rules 3.7(e)(1)(i), 3.1(e),
12
3.2(f)(4), 3.2(f)(3), 3.1(a), and 3.2(c)(2) of the Maine Bar Rules.
Before he concluded the proceeding, Judge Hart addressed the
fact that the attorney had filed a complaint with the Committee on
Judicial Responsibility and Disability on August 30;126 he noted that
she had sent him a copy of the complaint. 1 2 He suggested that her

removal of the proceeding to the Superior Court and her "intimidating complaint made to the Committee on Judicial Responsibility"'I2
might have been an effort to avoid appearing before him.
It may be noted that counsel unhappy with the decisions of [a
court] .

.

. do not normally file complaints of judicial misconduct

Judge Hart treated the appointment proceedings as a purely "probate" (and not a
"civil") matter. Claiming authority under Me. R, Prob. P. 41(a)(1), in which probate
proceedings may not be dismissed except upon order of the court, he entered the
order reproduced in the text accompanying this note. As the Committee pointed out,
however, the matter had been removed to Superior Court pursuant to Me. R. Civ. P.
71A, so there was no longer anything upon which the "Notice of Dismissal" could
operate. Matter of Hart, 577 A.2d at 354. The court held that Judge Hart committed
no ethical impropriety by conditioning his consent to the notice of dismissal upon the
attorney's September 6 appearance. See infra note 134.
120. Matter of Hart, 577 A.2d at 353.
121. Record at A-633.
122. Matter of Hart, 577 A.2d at 353.
123. Record at A-642 to A-655.
124. Id. at A-651.
125. Matter of Hart, 577 A.2d at 353.
126. Record at A-652.
127. Id. at A-23 to A-28.
128. Id. at A-652.
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pending the resolution of the cases pending before this court and
removed to the Sagadahoc County Superior Court before formal
judgments are entered of a final nature, but Attorney Farry, for
some unknown reason in her haste to obtain retribution against
Judge Hart, felt for whatever reason that she had to act contrary to
the majority of practitioners that practice competently and respectfully before the courts of this state. This court by statute has
a seal and is a court of record. It has, pursuant to 4 M.R.S.A. 201,
authority to punish for contempt of its authority.' 20
Judge Hart then concluded the proceeding by ordering the reporter
to prepare a transcript, which would be filed with the Board of
Overseers of the Bar. 130 The proceeding as transcribed spanned
twenty-eight pages of recorded text.' 31
B.

The Court Responds

After investigating the complaint filed by the attorney and holding a hearing on the matter, the Committee on Judicial Responsibil-

ity and Disability made its official report to the Supreme Judicial
Court on December 1, 1989.132 In its report, the Committee referred
two charges to the court. Briefly stated, the charges were (1) that
Judge Hart improperly ordered the attorney to appear before him
for hearing by deliberately making a false statement on the face of
the order, and (2) that his conduct at the hearing was unfair, undignified, and discourteous. 3 3 This Note will discuss the court's treatment of the second charge, which concerns nonjudicial demeanor

and implicates Canons 1, 2A, and 3 A(3).' 3'

129. Id. at A-653.
130. Matter of Hart, 577 A.2d at 353-54.
131. Record at A-631 to A-661. The court reporter testified before the Committee
that a transcript of this length would ordinarily be taken in one third of the time it in
fact took during the September 6 proceeding. Id. at A-413 to A-415.
132. Matter of Hart, 577 A.2d at 351.
133. Id. at 352.
134. The theory of the Committee's first charge was that Judge Hart's order requiring the attorney to appear before him on September 6 was improper because the
order was allegedly pretextual. Id. at 354. The order was allegedly pretextual because
of:
Judge Hart['s] misuse [of] his judicial office by deliberately entering a false
order of the court, dated August 26, 1988, knowing at the time that it was
false, by ordering the same attorney to appear before him to discuss issues
that he then knew were not in controversy and in proceedings that had
already been removed to the Superior Court and were no longer within his
jurisdiction.
Record at A-8. Thus, according to the Committee, Judge Hart arguably entered the
false order because he feared he might not have authority to express to the attorney
his displeasure with her actions. In his testimony before the Committee, the Judge
agreed that there were no longer any substantive issues to discuss with respect to the
trust. Matter of Hart, 577 A.2d at 354.
In its opinion, the court ignored the gravamen of the Committee's charge. Without
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In its report to the Supreme Judicial Court, the Committee
charged that Judge Hart "failed to be courteous, patient, and dignified toward a person appearing before him in his judicial capacity,
and failed to maintain the decorum that is required of a judge in
judicial proceedings."1 35 The position in which the attorney was
placed was exacerbated by the fact that she had no opportunity at
the September 6 hearing to explain her actions and had received no
meaningful notice concerning which of her actions were to be called
into question at the hearing. Such conduct, if confirmed as true by
the court in its capacity as an original finder of facts, would clearly
be violative of the law of judicial conduct as established in prior
Maine cases and the Code. In earlier opinions the court had clearly
stated that judges should hold themselves to the highest levels of
dignified conduct, even if they believe that nonjudicial demeanor is
justified by external considerations and even if they sincerely believe
they are advancing the administration of justice. 13 In Hart, however, notwithstanding that it found all the allegations to be true, the
court declared that Judge Hart had not committed any ethical violation warranting sanction by the court. 3 "
Within the space of a single paragraph the court dismissed the
second charge. The court granted that Judge Hart's conduct "may
have resulted in discourtesy or unfairness,' ' 38 but held that "it does
not rise to the level of seriousness contemplated by the rules governing judicial misconduct.' 1 39 The court ignored its earlier admonitions that a judge is obliged to conduct his affairs, whether in court
addressing whether Judge Hart abused his judicial power by entering an allegedly
pretextual order, the court held that Judge Hart "committed no ethical impropriety
by conditioning his consent to the 'Notice of Dismissal' on attorney Farry appearing
on September 6 to discuss her conduct in the proceedings." Id.
The court came to this conclusion after "[nioting the authority conferred upon
[Judge Hart] by the Code of Judicial Conduct, as well as that provided by Me.R.
Prob. P. 41(a)(1)." Id. The court remarked that Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3
B(3), which states that "[a] judge should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary
measures against a lawyer for unprofessional conduct of which the judge may become
aware," gave Judge Hart "explicit authority to require attorney Farry to appear
before him ....
" Matter of Hart, 577 A.2d at 354. Nowhere does the Code suggest,
however, that Canon 3 B(3) is a "supercanon" which authorizes a judge to do
whatever he feels he must do to discipline a lawyer even if it results in an abuse of
the judicial office. See supra notes 17-18. With this reading of the Code the court has
concluded that the type of proceeding at issue in Charge 2 is "an appropriate disciplinary measure," and that the filing of an order that attempts to assert jurisdiction
over a matter that is no longer before a court is justifiable. But see Matter of Ross,
428 A.2d at 867 ("[U]nder no circumstances may a desire for simplicity permit the
entry of a false judgment.").
135. Record at A-8 to A-9.
136. See supra notes 74-88 and accompanying text.
137. Matter of Hart, 577 A.2d at 355.
138. Id.
139. Id.
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or away from it, in a manner that is thoroughly dignified so that he
may maintain the public's faith in the judiciary. The precedential
authority of Ross, Kellam, and Cox suggests that when an allegation
of discourtesy or unfairness is demonstrated to be true, there is a
violation not only of the Code of Judicial Conduct but also of the
very foundation upon which it rests-judicial accountability.
Instead, the court concluded that Judge Hart's actions did not
"rise to the level of seriousness contemplated by the rule governing
judicial misconduct. . . [and] emphasize[d] the following facts."I' 0
First, the court noted that the incident occurred in a "private setting" with only a few people present."" Cox, on the other hand, said
that the distinction between a public and private setting was irrelevant.142 Poor judicial conduct cannot be excused by any in-chambers
expectation of privacy.
Second, the court noted that the judge did not raise his voice or
use undignified language."" Neither was necessary to find a violation
in Kellam-what the judge said in that matter was more important
than how he said it. 144 The court necessarily has concluded that a
one-hundred-minute berating of an attorney is acceptable judicial
procedure.
Third, the opinion remarked that no pattern of misconduct was
established here." 5 However, once was enough in Cox."40 One might
conclude from this remark that a pattern of misconduct must be
established before the court will find an ethical violation, no matter
how serious the one-time breach of trust might be.
Finally, the court said that the judge had an obligation to address
instances of "perceived attorney misconduct. 1 4 7 This is irrelevant,
of course, since the issue in the case was the manner in which the
judge proceeded. The court's statement suggests as well that a judge
can act in any way he pleases as long as he can justify his action by
a perceived need to control what happens in his courtroom. This
fourth assertion by the court is extremely troubling for it implies
that a judge is free to violate the Code when "necessary," allowing
the judge to evade the Rules at will and routinely escape the full
obligation of accountability.
V. HART'S AFTERMATH: LOSING SIGHT OF JUDICIAL AccOUNTABILITY
Apart from the departure from precedent manifested in Hart, the
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id.
Id.
See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
Matter of Hart, 577 A.2d at 355.
See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
Matter of Hart, 577 A.2d at 355.
See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
Matter of Hart, 577 A.2d at 355.
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decision has two important ramifications. First, the court sent a
message to the Committee which might discourage it from vigorously investigating allegations of judicial misconduct in the future.
The court concluded its opinion with what amounted to a rebuke:
"In conclusion, we note that the Rules governing judicial misconduct
confer upon the Committee the authority to prosecute only those
instances of judicial misconduct that exceed in seriousness the mis' 148
takes and frailties of the ordinaryjudge."
The court cited no authority for this interpretation of the Rules,
and in fact there is no Rule which authorizes only the type of prosecutions suggested by the court. If anything, the Committee Rules
explicitly contemplate that any investigation which does proceed to
a hearing before the Committee will be referred to the court only if
' 149
the misconduct is deemed to be of a "serious nature."
Committee Rule 2(H)(i) is the Rule that comes closest to expressing the standard implied in the court's admonition: "After hearing
a matter, the Committee shall decide whether it is satisfied by a
preponderance of the evidence that . . . the judge has violated the
Code of Judicial Conduct and that the violation is of such a serious
nature as to warrant formal disciplinary action ... ."150 The Committee does not have the power to proceed on a complaint that is
"unfounded or frivolous or otherwise provides insufficient cause for
proceeding,"' 5' and has been granted the power to contact a judge
"to seek informal correction of any judicial conduct or practice
which the Committee determines may create an appearance of judi152
cial misconduct.'
Thus, had the Committee not sincerely believed that Judge Hart's
misconduct was sufficiently serious to merit further investigation
and a referral to the court, it would not have completed the investigation, proceeded through hearing, and reported the matter to the
court. Although the court is an independent finder of fact in judicial
discipline proceedings, it should have accorded more respect to the
findings of the Committee, who in good faith and after due deliberation referred this "sufficiently serious" matter to its attention. One
commentator has noted that state judicial conduct organizations err
on the side of leniency, which helps judges maintain their independence and ensures that judicial discipline proceedings will be re53
ferred only if the ethical violations are sufficiently serious.
148. Id. (emphasis supplied).
149. Rules, supra note 60, Rule 2(H)(i).
150. Id.
151. Id. at Rule 1B(iii).
152. Amendment of Order Establishing Committee on Judicial Responsibility and
Disability, Me. Rptr., 434-440 A.2d XXXVI.
153. Although the system tries to strike a perfect balance between fairness to
judges and enforcement of standards, it errs on the side of leniency. Judges
may be warned to abide by "high standards of conduct" and to lead lives
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Second, the court also appeared to indicate that it will be willing
to condemn an instance of judicial misconduct only if the misconduct is particularly egregious or insubordinate. This attitude is at
odds with the purpose of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which is to
promote the integrity and independence of the judiciary by ensuring
that judges observe high standards of conduct. To say that Judge
Hart "committed no ethical violations warranting sanction"', implies that there were violations of the Code in this case but they
simply were not important enough to address by a formal sanction.
A worse message could not be sent by the court to Mdine's citizens.
The disposition in this case lost sight of the premise that judges
hold their offices through the grace of the people, and it is to the
people that judges must be accountable. ' 5 By allowing a judge to
escape even an admonition that his conduct was improper, the court
tells the public that there are some ethical violations that simply do
not call judicial accountability into question. This notion-that
judges can administer their own brand of justice-severely damages
the confidence people have in the most important officer of the
courts. To prevent further damage, the Supreme Judicial Court
must reaffirm in its next judicial discipline decision the principles of
judicial accountability it once considered so important to the fundamental concept of government under law.
Harold T. Kelly Jr.

above reproach, but these and other goals are unenforceable because too
much enforcement would impair both judicial discretion and judges' privacy rights. Accordingly, those who enforce the lofty goals apply a sense of
reasonableness in determining whether a judge engaged in misconduct. The
gray areas make for stimulating discussions in a law school setting but generally are avoided by the Commission.
Gerald Stem, Is Judicial Discipline in New York State a Threat to Judicial Independence?, 7 PACE L. REv. 291, 386-87 (1987).
154. Matter of Hart, 577 A.2d at 355.
155. The purpose of sanctions in cases of judicial discipline, as in cases of
lawyer discipline, is not vengeance or retribution. Those concepts have no

place in a disciplinary system designed to assure the orderly administration
of justice in the public interest. Any sanction must be designed to preserve
the integrity and independence of the judiciary and to restore and reaffirm

the public confidence in the administration of justice. Any sanction must be
designed to announce publicly our recognition that there has been miscon-

duct; it must be sufficient to deter the individual being sanctioned from
engaging in such conduct and to prevent others from engaging in similar
misconduct in the future. Thus, we discipline a judge to instruct the public

and all judges, ourselves included, of the importance of the function performed by judges in a free society. We discipline a judge to reassure the

public that judicial misconduct is neither permitted nor condoned. We discipline a judge to reassure the public that the judiciary of this state is dedicated to the principle that ours is a government of laws and not of men.
Matter of Ross, 428 A.2d at 858, 868-69 (Me. 1981).

